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Speeding Up the International Community’s Response 
Time in Addressing Acts of Genocide:  Deferring to the 
Judgment of Nongovernmental Organizations  
 
 
JOSHUA M. KAGAN∗ 
 
 
“There is an urgent need to step up the level of preventive actions.  There 
must be an end to the pattern where intervention by armed forces stops 
atrocities only after the fact…”  
~ 
Mary Robinson1 
 
 
Abstract  
Although the United Nations’ 1948 Genocide Convention was a well-
intentioned step toward ending genocide, acts of genocide have continued 
since its ratification.  This paper suggests that because genocide is widely 
considered to be the most horrific of all crimes, the leaders of the international 
community owe it to their constituents to put some teeth in the Genocide 
Convention by increasing the speed with which acts of genocide are identified 
and eradicated.  In order to speed up the international community’s response 
time in stopping existing situations of genocide, this paper asserts that certain 
specified international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
should be given the designated role of identifying genocide and related acts.  
Such a designation would then initiate, within the U.N. system itself, 
appropriate action to stop these genocidal acts.   
This paper examines the relevant statutory provisions and precedents 
for significant NGO involvement within the United Nations (UN) system.  I 
also discuss several practical concerns associated with granting deference to 
NGOs and evaluate the degree to which such concerns may be refutable or 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, 2006, University of San Diego School of Law.  The author 
would like to offer his sincere thanks to his family for their unwavering support and 
to Professor Laura Adams for her invaluable guidance in the writing of this article.  
The author also wishes to profess his profound gratitude and admiration for all those 
that work for the causes of international humanitarian relief, international human 
rights, and the eradication of the scourge of genocide. 
1 See Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address at 
Fordham University School of Law, Nov. 4, 1999.  
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compelling.  This paper explores the moral and pragmatic values of creating a 
new system to identify cases of genocide, in the hope that the “never again” 
mentality that permeated the original drafting of the Genocide Convention can 
finally be given some force.       
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Genocide and the Convention    
                                                 
2 Members of these four sub-groups (national, ethnical, racial, and religious) are 
explicitly included within the ambit of the Genocide Convention.  See Convention on 
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 While it has probably become the best-known example of genocide, 
the Nazi Holocaust was not the first time in the twentieth century that an 
attempt was made to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.2  
Between 1915 and 1922, approximately 1.5 million Armenians living in 
Turkey were systematically killed through a series of forced deportations and 
massacres.3  And during 1932 and 1933, in response to efforts by Ukrainians 
to seek independence from Soviet rule, Joseph Stalin forced a famine upon the 
Ukrainians that scholars believe led to somewhere between seven and ten 
million deaths.4  In December of 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army marched 
into China’s capital city of Nanking and murdered approximately half of the 
city’s 600,000 inhabitants in the infamous Rape of Nanking.5  But it was not 
until the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust (1938 to 1945), where approximately 6 
million Jews, Gypsies, and other minority groups were systematically 
murdered, that the international community, and specifically the United 
Nations, made a concerted effort to identify and codify a response to the 
crime of genocide.6 
 
It is generally accepted that the term “genocide” was first coined by a 
Polish-Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin in 1944.7  Lemkin used the 
term to describe the policies of systematic and mass murder used by the Nazis 
during the Holocaust.8  While the Nazi Holocaust was neither the first, nor 
regrettably the last, incident of genocide, it opened the eyes of the 
international community to mankind’s horrific potential for systematic and 
holistic cruelty.  In 1945, top Nazis at the Nuremberg Trials were charged 
                                                                                                                    
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 2 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  
3 PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND 
AMERICA’S RESPONSE  175-180 (HarperCollins 2003).  
4 Anna Melnichuk, Ukraine Marks Famine That Killed Millions, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 22, 2003.  
5  IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING:  THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF 
WORLD WAR II 99-104 (BasicBooks 1997).  
6 The Website of the United States Holocaust Museum (Holocaust Museum), The 
Holocaust Encyclopedia, available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/indes.php?lalng=en&ModuleId=10005143 (accessed 
Feb. 5, 2006). 
7 Holocaust Museum, supra note 6, The Committee on Conscience, available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/history/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
8 Id.  
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with “crimes against humanity” rather than genocide.9  However the 
indictment itself accused the Nazis of having “conducted deliberate and 
systematic genocide… in order to destroy particular races and classes of 
people and national, racial or religious groups…”10  In the wake of the “never 
again” mentality that permeated much of post-World War II international 
affairs, the United Nations ratified the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948.11 
 
The Genocide Convention was an ambitious attempt by the 
international community to attach international criminal liability to genocide, 
as well as related crimes, and to establish a system whereby the perpetrators 
of any future acts of genocide could be punished.  But while the Genocide 
Convention has been, at best, arguably effective in punishing the perpetrators 
of acts of genocide, it has not met its initial goal of preventing future acts of 
genocide from occurring.  Despite the ratification of the Genocide Convention 
in 1948 and its entry into force in 1951, with 41 signatories and 133 parties, 
the commission of genocidal acts has continued.   For example, between 1975 
and 1979, Cambodian Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot orchestrated a systematic 
program of starvation, overwork, and executions, targeted largely at ethnic 
minorities, which left approximately two million people dead.12  In 1994, 
approximately 800,000 Rwandans of Tutsi descent were killed by Rwandan 
Hutu militias using clubs and machetes,13 at a rate as high as 10,000 killed per 
day.14  Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 200,000 Bosnian-Muslims 
were slaughtered by the Serbian forces of Slobodan Milosevic in mass killings 
and various other acts of “ethnic cleansing.”15 
 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 See The Jewish Virtual Library: A Division of the American-Israeli 
Cooperative Enterprise, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings – Indictment:  Count Three, 
available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Count3.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2006).   
11 Genocide Convention, supra note 3. 
12 Strobe Talbott, Defanging the Beast (U.S. policies supported the Pol Pot 
activities in Kampuchea), TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 40.  
13 Ross Herbert, Slaughter’s Fifth Anniversary Remembered:  800,000 were slain 
in genocide of ’94, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 5, 1999, at A11. 
14 The Website for The History Place, Genocide in the 20th Century, Rwanda 
1994, available at http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/rwanda.htm 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
15 William Drozdiak, Milosevic to Face Genocide Trial For Role in the War in 
Bosnia; Yugoslav Ex-Leader First Head of State to Be So Charged, WASHINGTON 
POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at A22.     
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While the Genocide Convention was a well-intentioned step in the 
right direction, more must be done in order to rid the world of the scourge of 
genocide.16  As genocide is widely considered to be the most horrific of all 
crimes, the leaders of the international community owe it to their constituents 
to “put some teeth” in the Genocide Convention by (a) increasing the speed 
by which acts of genocide are identified and dealt with, and (b) imputing 
more responsibility to states and international alliances to employ forceful 
intervention to stop acts of genocide.17  This paper will focus on the first 
prong of this recommendation:  speeding up the response time of the 
international community in stopping existing acts of genocide by giving 
certain specified international human rights NGOs the designated role of 
identifying genocide and related acts, and thus initiating, within the U.N. 
system itself, action to stop these genocidal acts. 
 
 
The Existing Structure:  The Genocide Convention and How It Works 
  
 The Genocide Convention defines genocide as certain acts that are 
done with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group.18  For the purposes of the Convention, these acts include:  
killing members of such a group; causing serious mental or bodily harm to the 
members of such a group; deliberately inflicting on such a group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in 
part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.19  Thus, a variety 
of acts are considered by the Convention to constitute genocide, with the 
primary distinguishing attribute being that such acts are committed against a 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the intention of destroying that 
group in whole or in part.  In addition to specific acts of genocide, as defined 
above, the Genocide Convention also attaches criminal liability to a variety of 
associated acts including:   
• conspiracy to commit genocide;  
• direct and public incitement to commit genocide;  
                                                 
16 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at preamble. 
17 For a discussion of the second prong of this recommendation, see Joshua M. 
Kagan, Comment, The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide:  An 
Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility, 7 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L. J. (forthcoming May 2006).  
18 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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• attempt to commit genocide; and  
• complicity to commit genocide.20  
This criminal liability can attach to either responsible leaders or private 
individuals for the commission of any of these aforementioned acts.21  
 
 Each contracting party to the Genocide Convention undertakes to 
enact domestic legislation that gives effect to the provisions of the Convention 
and provides domestic penalties for persons under that particular state’s 
jurisdiction who are found to be guilty of committing genocide or any of the 
other associated acts as stated in the Convention.22  Under the Convention, 
persons charged with the commission of genocide or one of the related acts 
may be tried in a competent national court of the state where the act was 
committed or by an international penal tribunal which has jurisdiction over 
the matter.23  The Genocide Convention states that the jurisdiction of this 
international penal tribunal is established when the contracting parties 
involved in the dispute have accepted such jurisdiction.24  It is presumably 
under this framework, and in accordance with the U.N. Security Council’s 
Chapter VII powers of the U.N. Charter,25 that the international community 
has established the ad hoc criminal tribunals in Rwanda26 and Bosnia27 to try 
those responsible for the genocidal acts committed in those nations. 
 
One may also assume that the international penal tribunal envisioned 
by the drafters of the Genocide Convention28 has now been established 
through the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The ICC was 
established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on July 
17, 1998, when 120 states adopted the Statute.29  The Rome Statute entered 
into force on July 1, 2002.30  It specifically states that the subject matter 
                                                 
21 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 4. 
22 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 U.N. Charter, art. 39; U.N. Charter, art. 41; see Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Jurisdiction Appeal, ICTY, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995). 
26 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994.  S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(Nov. 8, 1994).     
27 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was created by 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993.  S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
28 See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 6. 
29 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] 
30 Id. 
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jurisdiction of the ICC extends to alleged cases of genocide,31 using the same 
definition of the crime that is found in the Genocide Convention.32  Thus, for 
future incidents of genocide, it seems safe to assume that the ICC will provide 
the forum for adjudication that was proposed in the Genocide Convention.   
 
But in order to try a person for allegedly committing genocide or any 
of the related acts, the ICC must also have personal jurisdiction over that 
person.  This personal jurisdiction of the ICC extends only to states that have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court either generally, by becoming a party to 
the Rome Statute,33 or specifically, by accepting the court’s jurisdiction for 
this particular case or crime.34 The ICC may then exercise its jurisdiction if 
such jurisdiction has been accepted by either the state where the alleged 
genocidal act occurred35 or the state of which the person accused of the crime 
is a national.36     
 
Cases brought before the ICC, including those involving allegations 
of genocide, may be initiated in one of three ways.  First, the ICC may exert 
jurisdiction over a case occurs when a situation is referred to the Prosecutor of 
the ICC by a State Party to the Rome Statute.37  Second, the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction when a case is referred to the Prosecutor by the United 
Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.38  Third, a case may be brought before the ICC when the 
Prosecutor initiates an investigation herself.39   
 
 
Problems with the Current System 
 
 Given the examples above, it seems clear that the international 
response to acts of genocide must be a swift one.  Urgent action is 
necessitated both by the speed with which genocidal acts can occur and the 
severity of those acts.  The importance of such urgency becomes all the more 
evident when viewed in light of the death rates that have ensued from some of 
the commonly considered acts of genocide in the 20th century:  10,000 deaths 
per day in 1994 Rwanda;40 over 9,000 deaths per day at Auschwitz in the 
                                                 
31 Id.  at art. 5. 
32 See id. at art. 6. 
33 Id. at art. 12(1). 
34 Id. at art. 12(3).   
35 Id. at art. 12(2)(a).  
36 Id. at art. 12(2)(b).   
37 Id. at art. 13(a).  
38 Id. at art 13(b).  
39 Id. at art. 13(c).  
40 See The Website for The History Place, Genocide in the 20th Century, Rwanda 
1994, supra note 20.   
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summer of 1944;41 25,000 deaths per day during the spring of 1933 as a result 
of Stalin’s Forced Famine in the Ukraine.42   
 
 Unfortunately, the responses of the international community to the 
genocidal acts that occurred more recently in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia suffered from what I refer to as the “time lag problem,” and thus 
did not have this requisite urgency.  By labeling the current system (to the 
extent that the system used in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia can be 
referred to as the “current system,” an issue which I will address below), as 
having this “time lag problem,” I suggest that the response from the 
international community to these suspected situations of genocide was too 
slow given their severity and the propensity for almost instantaneous mass 
murders that occurs in cases of genocide.    
 
 Bosnia.  In 1991, the Serbian minority in Croatia rebelled against the 
government.43  It was widely contended that Serbian president Slobodan 
Milosevic had prompted this revolution in order to “establish a Greater 
Serbia.”44  After the city of Vukovar fell on November 18, 1991,45 the Serbs 
began the first mass executions of the conflict, killing hundreds of Croat men 
and burying them in mass graves.46  More bombs were dropped on Vukovar in 
three months than during the entirety of World War II.47  In response to 
reports of such atrocities, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 780 on October 6, 1992.48  This Resolution urged the Secretary-
General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and 
analyze the situation, and to specifically consider the international law 
implications of actions being committed in the former Yugoslavia.49  Once the 
Commission of Experts had concluded that violations of international law 
were occurring in Bosnia, the Security Council adopted Resolution 827 on 
                                                 
41 Id. at The Nazi Holocaust, 1938-1945, available at 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/holocaust.htm (last visited Feb. 
5, 2006).   
42 Id. at Stalin’s Forced Famine, 1932-1933, available at 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/stalin.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006).  
43 Laura Silber, Anxious Croats Watch and Wait, Expecting the Worst, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 5, 1991, at 2.  
44 Id.  
45 Bloodbath Feared as Croats Desperately Seek Surrender; Vukovar Falls After 
3 Months of Fighting; 1,000 Casualties, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 18, 1991, at A7.  
46 Georgie Anne Geyer, U.N. Intervention Too Late; European City of Vukovar 
Drew Wrath of the Serbs, WASHINGTON TIMES, August 11, 2002.  
47 Id.  
48 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 780, S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992).  
49  Id.  
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May 25, 1993, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).50  
 
Rwanda.  On January 11, 1994, the military commander of the United 
Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, sent a fax to 
U.N. headquarters in New York, warning that genocide was being planned by 
the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority.51  Dallaire’s fax did not receive a 
substantive response from the United Nations Secretariat, despite mounting 
evidence not only that ethnic and political tensions were increasing, but that 
Tutsis were being registered to facilitate the process of their extermination.52  
Finally, on July 1, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935, once 
again establishing a Commission of Experts.53  The Commission’s findings 
indicated that mass exterminations being conducted by Hutus against Tutsis 
constituted genocide.54  In response, the Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on November 8, 1994, 
when it adopted Resolution 1168.55  
 
Despite credible indications that genocide was being committed in 
both Rwanda and Bosnia, the response of the United Nations, and thus the 
international community, lacked the speed that genocide requires.  There 
seem to be two distinct problems that kept the international response from 
being as quick as it should have been to stop the killings in these two 
situations.  First, the existing system under the UN in which a Commission of 
Experts was established to examine each situation was too slow and deliberate 
to deal adequately with ongoing cases of genocide.  Though this system is not 
well suited to dealing with acts of genocide I will not elaborate extensively on 
the deficiencies of the specific systems used in Rwanda and Bosnia as this is 
likely now a moot point.  Suffice it to say that it lacks the requisite sense of 
                                                 
50 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).  
51 Karin Davies, Annan: UN Lacked Members’ Support to Prevent Rwandan 
Genocide, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 4, 1998.   
52 See Annan Knew of Genocide, Report Says, ATLANTA JOURNAL & 
CONSTITUTION, May 4, 1998, at A7.  
53 United Nations Security Council Resolution 935, S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994).  
54 See Alain Destexhe, The Third Genocide (Rwanda), 97 FOREIGN POLICY, Dec. 
22, 1994.  
55 The tribunal was officially named “The International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory 
of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”  See United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1168, S.C. Res. 1168, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1168 
(May 21, 1998).  
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urgency that must exist to prevent mass killings and genocidal acts.  This is 
because future cases of genocide will likely be investigated and dealt with 
under the new system established by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.56  As discussed above, rather than relying on 
recommendations made by a Commission of Experts, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over cases in three distinct ways, none of which requires the establishment of 
a Commission of Experts.57 
 
But the second, more significant problem with the international 
community’s response to the genocidal acts committed in Rwanda and Bosnia 
was the amount of time it took to initiate any United Nations action in the first 
place.  In the case of Bosnia, the time lag between the atrocities of Vukovar 
and relevant action by the UN at least to take steps toward stopping the 
genocide (in this case, the establishment of the Commission of Experts) was 
nearly eleven months.58  In Rwanda, the time lag between the Dallaire fax and 
the establishment of the Commission of Experts was almost six months.59  
Given that genocide can result in thousands of people being killed each day, 
these response times are inexcusable .60 
 
Of course, it is possible that under the newly enacted system of the 
International Criminal Court, cases of genocide will be dealt with swiftly and 
appropriately.  However, given that it is widely accepted that genocidal acts 
are being committed today in Darfur, Sudan.61  Neither the current structure of 
the ICC nor that of the UN has taken adequate measures to deal with these 
atrocities,62 so it must appears that the newer ICC system will also lack the 
urgency of action that plagued the UN process in Rwanda and Bosnia.    
 
 
Fixing the Problem: Increasing the Role of International Human Rights 
NGOs in Identifying Cases of Genocide   
 
                                                 
56 Rome Statute, supra note 43.  
57 Rome Statute, supra notes 49-51.  
58 See Bloodbath Feared, supra note 59; See S.C. Res. 780, supra note 62 
(Vukovar fell on November 18, 1991, and the Security Council passed Resolution 
780, establishing a Commission of Experts, on October 6, 1992).  
59 See Davies, supra note 65; See S.C. Res. 935, supra note 67 (Dallaire sent his 
fax to the U.N. on January 11, 1994, and the Security Council passed Resolution 935, 
establishing a Commission of Experts, on July 1, 1994).  
60 See supra notes 54-57.  
61 Richard O’Brien, More Than Words for Darfur, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 
2004, at A25.  
62 See Rice Mixes Tactics in Darfur Response; U.S. Backs U.N. Probe, Not Court, 
WASHINGTON POST, July 31, 2005, at A6.  
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 But all hope is not lost.  There is a practical and feasible solution to 
this problem.  By granting more deference to international human rights 
NGOs to identify cases of genocide, and thereby setting the wheels in motion 
for a concerted response by the international community, genocidal acts will 
be addressed promptly and the killings can be stopped before the true horror is 
realized.   
 
 
Statutory Provisions Relevant to Increasing the Role of NGOs in 
Identifying Cases of Genocide  
 
This article assumes that these NGOs will function as a part of the 
new ICC system.  Thus, in considering whether the current framework allows 
for NGOs to take such a significant role in identifying cases of genocide, 
interest must be paid to both the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.  It is my contention that both of these 
documents allow for such deference to be given to NGOs.   
 
The Genocide Convention allows for any Contracting Party to request 
that “the competent organs” of the United Nations take appropriate action for 
the prevention and suppression of genocide, as long as that action is in 
accordance with the U.N. Charter.63  Thus, once a State Party to the Genocide 
Convention has asked the United Nations to intervene, the Genocide 
Convention authorizes the UN to take any reasonable action under its Charter 
to prevent cases of genocide or to halt ongoing cases of genocide.  Thus, it 
flows from this language that in order to analyze whether the Genocide 
Convention allows for the involvement of NGOs, one must first analyze 
whether the United Nations Charter makes any allowances for such NGO 
involvement.   
 
While not an express authorization for NGO involvement, it is 
significant enough to note that the very first stated purpose of the United 
Nations, according to the U.N. Charter, is the maintenance of international 
peace and security.64  Therefore, actions taken in furtherance of this goal -- 
such as measures intended to stop acts of genocide -- would more likely be 
found acceptable under the auspices of the Charter than would any sort of 
action not directly associated with such a fundamental tenet of the UN  As 
such, granting an NGO authority to identify existing cases of genocide, and 
thereby allowing for genocidal acts to be more promptly identified and dealt 
with, would presumably be forwarding the goal of maintaining international 
peace and security and thus would be acceptable under the Charter.  
 
                                                 
63 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 8.   
64 See U.N. Charter, art. 1.  
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But the Charter also expressly authorizes one of the “competent 
organs” of the UN to involve NGOs in its decision-making process.  The UN 
Charter gives the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the right to 
consult with any NGOs which are concerned with matters within ECOSOC’s 
area of competence.65  ECOSOC itself is permitted by the Charter to make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting human rights.66  It follows 
logically then that the UN Charter authorizes the Economic and Social 
Council (a “competent organ” of the United Nations) to consult with NGOs in 
making recommendations to the rest of the UN related to upholding and 
promoting human rights.  Given that the suppression of genocide must 
inherently be an act which is promoting human rights, the UN Charter allows 
for NGO consultation regarding acts of genocide.  Since such consultation is 
permitted by the UN Charter, it is then also in accordance with the language 
of the Genocide Convention.67 
 
In addition – and perhaps more relevant – under the present system 
for addressing cases of genocide, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court also makes an allowance for the involvement of NGOs in 
identifying cases of genocide.  As mentioned above, one of the ways that 
cases may be brought before the ICC is when an investigation into such a case 
is initiated by the ICC Prosecutor.68  The Rome Statute also specifically 
provides that the Prosecutor may seek additional information towards this end 
from NGOs.69  It is within this framework, and still in accordance with the 
provisions of the Rome Statute, that I am suggesting an expanded role for 
NGOs.   
 
Rather than overhauling the existing system, I propose granting 
enough authority to certain designated international human rights NGOs who 
already may be cognizant of ongoing acts of genocide, to identify a situation 
to be genocide for purposes of triggering applicable UN processes and the 
ICC process of dealing with genocide and crimes against humanity.  This 
recommendation would be made by the NGO to the ICC Prosecutor who 
would then bring the case before the ICC itself.  Thus, the case would still be 
brought before the ICC by the Prosecutor, as in the current system, but the 
Prosecutor could appropriate the allegations of genocide being made by the 
NGO as his own.  By deferring to the initial determination by the NGO that 
genocide is occurring, the international community, specifically the ICC, 
would be able to address more promptly the atrocities that are being 
committed.    
                                                 
65 Id. at art. 71.  
66 Id. at art. 62, para. 2.  
67 Genocide Convention, supra note 74.  
68 Rome Statute, supra  note 51.   
69 Rome Statute, at art. 15(2).  
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Precedents for Increasing the Role of NGOs  
 
 In addition to the statutory allowances contained in the Genocide 
Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, there 
are also existing precedents for increasing roles and granting greater 
deference to the decisions of NGOs in international affairs.  While these 
examples do not deal explicitly with granting NGOs greater deference in 
identifying cases of genocide, they do suggest that precedents exist for giving 
NGOs greater control and responsibility within the international arena.    
 
 As mentioned above, the UN Charter grants the Economic and Social 
Council the ability to consult with NGOs.70  ECOSOC has a special 19-
member Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations that considers 
applications from NGOs for consultative status.71  This consultative status 
allows the NGOs access to UN documents and public meetings and limited 
privileges to speak or circulate statements in ECOSOC.72  Thus, in allowing 
NGOs to have consultative status with ECOSOC, the U.N. Charter sets a 
precedent for increasing the role of NGOs in international affairs.  It is to 
these ECOSOC-designated NGOs that I refer to here. 
 
 Another precedent for increasing the responsibility and deference 
given to NGOs came with the role of NGOs at the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo.  The ICPD was 
a United Nations conference intended to produce policies related to 
population growth, women’s reproductive rights, and the effects of these two 
issues on international economic and social development.73  NGOs played a 
major role in the preparatory proceedings leading up to the conference and in 
the conference itself, including instrumental roles in deciding how topics 
would be handled in the PrepCom and which topics would be covered in the 
Program of Action.74  The Cairo Conference signified an important event for 
NGOs as it saw nations the world defer much decision-making power to 
NGOs involved in their respective areas of expertise.  
 
 NGOs also played a major role in the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL).  ICBL was originally founded in October 1992 by a small 
                                                 
70 U.N. Charter, art. 71.   
71 See ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, 49th plenary meeting, 25 July 1996.  
72 Id.  
73 C. Alison McIntosh & Jason L. Finkle, The Cairo Conference on Population 
and Development: A New Paradigm?, 21 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 223, 223-
260 (June 1995).  
74 See Joakim Lie, Population, Progress … and “Peanuts”, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 
22, 1999.  
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group of NGOs that advocated for a global ban on the use of landmines.75  
After a U.N. conference to address the landmine issue reached an impasse, 
ICBL, other NGOs, and some mid-size states created an alternative forum 
which came to be known as the Ottawa Process.76  Strongly supported by and 
constituted of NGOs, in just over a year the Ottawa Process produced the 
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty).77   
 
 As of November 29, 2004, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty had been 
ratified or acceded to by 144 states.78  The treaty, which prohibits the 
production of and use of landmines and requires parties to destroy stockpiled 
and buried landmines, represents the first time that an active weapons system 
has been banned outright since poison gas was outlawed after World War I.79  
In 1997, ICBL received the Nobel Peace Prize.80  The International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines was significant in that it is a clear example of NGOs being 
granted deference in a decision-making process that had a significant effect on 
the nation-states of the world.  Furthermore, as the banning of landmines is 
often considered a humanitarian or human rights issue, ICBL also stands as an 
example of such deference being granted to NGOs in the context of a binding 
human rights agreement.  Thus, the deference given to the NGOs that made 
up ICBL can be seen as a precursor to the deference that would be granted to 
NGOs in identifying cases of genocide under the frameworks of the Genocide 
Convention and the International Criminal Court.   
 
 
Practical Concerns for Granting Greater Authority to NGOs in 
Identifying Cases of Genocide  
 
 While the existing precedents and statutory allowances seem to bode 
well for the argument in support of granting greater deference to NGOs in 
identifying cases of genocide, there are also several practical issues that must 
                                                 
75 See The Website of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Campaign 
History, available at 
http://www.icbl.org/campaign/history?eZSESSIDicbl=143feb7820c22f114b84528dc2
b237d5 (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).  
76 See David Davenport, The New Diplomacy (Alliance of NGOs and Small and 
Medium Sized Nations), POLICY REVIEW, Dec. 1, 2002.  
77 See The Website of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, supra note 
89, at Treaty Members, available at http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2006).  
78 Id.  
79 Land-Mine Foes Celebrate Historic Day; Treaty Signing Begins, Without 
United States, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 4, 1997.  
80 ‘There’s Still Too Many,’ NEWSWEEK, March 8, 1999, at 29.  
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be taken into account if such an idea is to be seriously considered.  These 
practical matters must be considered in order to determine if these NGOs can 
be an important part of the international system for preventing and 
suppressing genocide within the framework of the Genocide Convention and 
the ICC.  Among these practical concerns are the geographic location and 
available manpower of such international human rights NGOs, their 
established neutrality and credibility, the lack of political constraints on these 
NGOs, and the accountability of the NGOs to the international community.   
 
 While there are several NGOs which could be considered appropriate 
for this role of reporting to the Prosecutor of the ICC, I have chosen to focus 
on one:  the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  My reasons 
for this are primarily twofold.  First, focusing on just one NGO in a field of 
several suitable possibilities allows the discussion to be more concrete and 
focused in terms of real numbers and dates rather than a generic discussion of 
the capabilities of all international human rights NGOs or a survey of several 
relevant NGOs on a superficial level.  Second, the ICRC is widely considered 
to be one of the oldest and most respected NGOs in the world.  While this is 
especially relevant in light of the requisite neutrality and credibility that an 
NGO in this proposed position must possess, the importance of such factors 
pervades all of the relevant practical considerations.   
 
 
Human Resources and Scope of Deployment  
 
 The first issue which must be addressed is the realistic ability of 
international human rights NGOs to act as an investigatory agent for the 
world, and specifically for the Prosecutor of the ICC regarding the existence 
of genocide.  Put more specifically, do these NGOs have the human resources 
to span the globe while conducting on-site investigations of alleged cases of 
genocide?  In 2003, the ICRC had a total staff of 12,483 persons.81  Of that 
number, 11,660 were located in the field.82  These personnel were distributed 
throughout the world in such a way that the ICRC maintained a permanent 
presence in 79 countries throughout the world.83  Furthermore, as an 
international aid organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission,84 the 
                                                 
81 The International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report 2003, at 10, 
available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/628EFL/$FILE/ICRC_overview_2
003.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter ICRC Annual Report 
2003].  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 See id at 39.  
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tangible presence of the ICRC was primarily in nations experiencing human 
rights and humanitarian crises.85   
 
It would be both naïve and largely inaccurate to claim that acts of 
genocide can only occur during crisis situations or in times of political 
instability.  However, genocide watchdog groups generally agree that the 
existence of certain circumstances does correspond to an increased probability 
that genocidal acts may occur.86  These include:  
• the existence of distinct minority subgroups within a 
population, and  
• a perceived scarcity of resources (of one sort or another), 
such that the members of these groups believe they are in 
competition with one another for such resources.  
 
Having such a broad international presence in exactly the same areas 
which are experiencing crisis situations makes the ICRC an appropriate 
investigator of the propensity for genocidal acts in these areas.  Time need not 
be wasted by organizing and dispatching an information gathering 
commission to report on allegations of genocide or related crimes, for 
oftentimes NGOs such as the ICRC are already on location.  For example, 
consider that at the time the UN Security Council established a Commission 
of Experts to investigate the allegations of genocide in Rwanda, the ICRC 
already had a sizable delegation in that country for approximately four years 
working directly with the population most susceptible to genocidal acts.87 
 
 
Neutrality and Credibility    
 
 The second issue which must be addressed is the extent to which 
international human rights NGOs already have established reputations for 
neutrality and credibility both within the distressed populations they are 
serving and within the international community in general.  First, it is 
instrumental to the success of any organization or commission that is seeking 
                                                 
85 See ICRC Annual Report 2003, supra note 95.  
86 See The Website of the Campaign to End Genocide, The Need for Effective 
Early Warning Structures at the UN, available at http://www.endgenocide.org/ceg-
ew/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).  
87 ICRC Annual Report 2003, supra note 95, at 15.  The ICRC opened a 
delegation in Rwanda in 1990.  Prior to that time, the ICRC covered Rwanda from its 
regional delegation.  The U.N. did not establish its Commission of Experts until it 
adopted Resolution 935 in July 1994. 
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to gather ascertainable facts of the existence of genocide for its process to be 
perceived as unbiased and non-threatening by the local population.  Such a 
positive local perception helps to facilitate the information gathering process 
as it is likely to  
• increase the chances of unfettered access to current events,  
• increase the chances of an open discourse between the information 
gatherers and the population at hand, and  
• decrease the chances of hostile resistance to the mission or general 
presence of the information gatherers by the local population.   
Second, an organization which is gathering information to report to the world 
community must be perceived as unbiased and credible by the world 
community before any credence will be given to their observations and 
allegations.   
 
One of the primary difficulties of an international NGO in this context 
would be the tension between these two obligations.  If the NGO is seen by 
locals as focusing too much time and attention on information-gathering in its 
efforts to serve the goals of the ICC system and the international community 
at large, the NGO may lose some of its credibility in the eyes of these locals; 
but, if the NGO is perceived by the international community as being 
controlled more by ideological attachment to aid the affected community 
rather than as an unbiased agent of the Prosecutor, the NGO is likely to lose 
credibility within the international system.  While it must be acknowledged 
that the potential for a certain degree of conflict exists between the obligations 
to each of these communities, a well established NGO would have the 
credibility and social capital to achieve a balance.  The ICRC seems to fit the 
bill, having aided millions of victims of wars since its founding in 1863.88 
 
In the context of identifying genocidal acts, the roles of humanitarian 
aid organization and international information-gatherer need not be mutually 
exclusive.  It should be noted that the role of NGOs in this system would not 
be comparable to the role of the media, that of an unbiased reporter of facts,89 
but rather as an interested party, interested in the preservation of human life 
and human rights, who is reporting on such acts in order that appropriate 
                                                 
88 See The Website of the International Committee of the Red Cross, History of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, Volume 1: From Solferino to Tsushima 
available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList288/7A1390B93A4FE56BC1256D
E80055ACD0 (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).  
89 However, this assertion has been challenged even in the media.  Journalist Ed 
Vulliamy has gone on record as saying, “I believe there are times in history – as any 
good Swiss banker will tell you – that neutrality is not neutral, but complicit in the 
crime.”  See Ed Vulliamy, Comment, An Obligation to the Truth: Journalists should 
be prepared to risk their safety and testify at the International Criminal Court.  THE 
[LONDON] OBSERVER. May 19, 2002, at 30.  
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action may be taken by the UN or the ICC at the international level.  It is this 
very fact that makes international human rights NGOs (such as the ICRC) 
prime candidates for the role of identifying cases of genocide:  their ulterior 
motives, if they are in fact presumed to have any, are the preservation of 
human life and the affirmation of human rights.   
 
International human rights NGOs do not pander to corporate or 
special interest groups as national governments inevitably do and they need 
not appease the often antithetical interests of national governments as 
international pseudo-governmental organizations such as the U.N. invariably 
must.  It seems to be a valid presumption that if such an NGO is to err in its 
identification of genocide, it will be likely to err on the side of identifying too 
many horrific violations of human rights as genocide.  While an over-use of 
the authority to officially identify or designate acts as genocidal is likely to 
engender some skepticism by the international community towards future 
declarations made by the NGO, it certainly seems to be the lesser of two evils.  
The proposition, taken to its farthest conclusion, that an NGO such as the 
ICRC will claim too many violent crisis situations are genocide, thus 
initiating the international processes of the Genocide Convention and the ICC 
and perhaps overtaxing the resources of the international community to 
address future acts of genocide, still seems to be a far better option than the 
alternative.  History seems to indicate that this alternative is to allow 
genocidal acts to go on largely unabated until the various political factions 
and levels of bureaucracy of the UN decide that the time for action is ripe.90  
If the goal of the Genocide Convention, and moreover human rights and 
humanitarian law in general, is the preservation of human life, then shouldn’t 
the international community be willing to err on the side of prevention of 
potential genocide rather than on the side of political expediency? 
Additionally, if at a later point in time the international community decides 
that this proposed NGO-watchdog system is not working as well as planned, 
the UN or ICC can attempt to find a different solution, having lost nothing in 
the endeavor.   
 
 
Lack of geopolitical constraints  
                                                 
90 Ambassador Karl Kovanda, the United Nations representative from the Czech 
Republic in 1994 (at which time the Czech Republic was one of the non-permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council), stated that he learned more about the 
genocide occurring in Rwanda from human rights groups in New York than from 
sitting in Security Council meetings.  According to Kovanda, the U.N. officials whose 
duty it was to report to the Security Coucil had failed to describe the systematic 
slaughter that was occurring.  See Briefing by Linda Melvern, March 11, 2002, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum available at  
http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/analysis/index.php?content=details.php%3Fconte
nt%3D2002-03-11%26menupage%3DCentral+Africa (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).  
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As referenced above, one of the obstacles for national and supra-
national organizations is the limitation of geopolitical constraints.  These 
constraints, not present for NGOs, include treaty alliances, state economic 
interests, and the general milieu of realpolitik, to name a few.  While certainly 
not an all-encompassing example, the atrocities of the Pol Pot massacres 
illustrate the shortcomings of national and supra-national alliances in this 
context.   
 
As previously noted, between the years of 1975 and 1979, the 
Cambodian dictator Pol Pot presided over the murder, overwork, and 
starvation of approximately 2 million people.91  The ratio of deaths to 
population made the Cambodian revolution the most murderous in a century 
of revolutions.92  In 1979, a United Nations Special Rapporteur from Tunisia 
investigated the Pol Pot massacres and came to the conclusion that more than 
a million people had been killed.93  But despite the fact that the Pol Pot 
massacres became one of the best-documented cases in the history of the UN, 
no country or organization seemed willing to follow up on this report.94  This 
lack of UN action has been attributed to the fact that the politics of Southeast 
Asia at the time were such that the major powers decided it was better to 
focus on the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.95  In the face of one of the 
most egregious acts of genocide ever committed, the UN remained politically 
hamstrung by the individual self-interest of its members, and Pol Pot eluded 
justice.   
 
The example of UN inaction in the case of the Pol Pot massacres 
speaks to a significant strength of a system that heavily involves NGOs for 
identification of genocidal acts.  While the potential certainly still exists for 
political hamstringing and snarls in bureaucratic red tape when an NGO 
reports to the Prosecutor for the ICC, the involvement of non-political 
organizations at some level in the overall process is a major step toward a 
human rights structure than can exist without the inefficiencies and 
geopolitical exigencies present in the current UN system.  The contention is 
not that granting human rights NGOs greater deference in identifying cases of 
genocide will be an immediate cure for the ills of the current system, but 
rather that it would signify a substantial step in the right direction, one 
                                                 
91 Talbott, supra note 18.   
92 David Chandler, Pol Pot: Cambodia’s Ruthless Dictator Cheated Justice, 
Dying Before He Could Answer for the Atrocities Committed During His Unrelenting 
Quest to Create a Rural Utopia, TIME INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 23, 1999.  
93 Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years, 92 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 1, 5 (1998).  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
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towards allocating a measure of control and responsibility to the group that is 
best suited to make determinations of genocide.  
 
As they are for the most part unaffiliated with issues of national 
interest and other political and economic motivations, human rights NGOs are 
able to conform their actions solely to the notion of upholding basic human 
rights.  While such actions may not be politically expedient for a nation-state 
or a collaborative organization of nation-states, they are the very mission of 
human rights NGOs such as the ICRC.96  Their status allows such 
organizations to avoid the geopolitical constraints that have plagued national 
and U.N. decision-making processes.  Additionally, as largely non-
deliberative organizations, NGOs are free from the alliances and self-serving 
politics that plagued the U.N. Security Council throughout the Cold War and 
to an extent, still do so today.   
 
 
Accountability  
 
In addition to the possible lack of typical geopolitical constraints on 
NGOs is the contention that NGOs lack accountability.  By lacking the very 
same deliberative process and responsiveness to various constituencies that 
hamstring national andUN decision-making, some may argue that NGOs 
cannot be held accountable for their decisions and are able to run roughshod 
over the will of the international community or even the populations of 
individual countries.  This argument fails for two reasons.  First, the scope of 
the authority granted to NGOs in this plan is not the type of authority that 
warrants a fear of tyranny or oppression.  NGOs such as the ICRC would only 
be making direct recommendations to the Prosecutor of the ICC.  It would not 
be making general administrative decisions in terms of mobilizing troops or 
allocating resources.  The aim of including such NGOs in the process is 
merely one that can make the process become more efficient and better able to 
respond to the rapid pace with which genocide occurs.  This should result in a 
strict international condemnation of genocide, lower death tolls, and a 
stronger affirmation of human rights.  All of these ideals serve the public 
good and leave the NGOs little or no room for any sort of manipulation of 
their duty or any other sort of unchecked power.  
 
Second, the belief that NGOs in this proposed system would operate 
without basic checks and balances is unfounded.  Again, if a given NGO 
proves to over-apply the term “genocide” in describing international 
atrocities, the UN or ICC will have the option to designate a different NGO to 
investigate or even to try a different system altogether.  Thus, there exists an 
incentive for NGOs to be cautious in their designation of acts as genocide so 
                                                 
96 ICRC Annual Report 2003, supra note 95, at 39.  
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that they are not stripped of their new deference under the proposed system.  
Additionally, as part of a market structure, the NGOs being given authority in 
this proposed system may still have to compete with other human rights 
NGOs.  While NGOs are not lucrative businesses and not as susceptible to 
financial motivations and other market forces as the average corporate entity, 
they still rely heavily on human resources and social capital.  Thus, if a 
particular NGO is not being responsive to the collective will of the people 
(presumably to appropriately label genocidal acts as such), then the people 
will cede this NGO less credibility.  Hence the NGOs remain largely 
accountable to the people and the common good, though not controlled by the 
individual economic interests and political red tape that undermine concerted 
action of the national or supra-national level.  Finally, it should be noted that 
national delegations to the U.N. are not elected, but are appointed by their 
respective governments, thereby also inhibiting their accountability to the 
general populace.   
 
 
What if the Time Lag is Intentional?   
 
 The time lag problem apparent in the current system appears to be a 
byproduct of systemic deficiencies rather than the purposeful result of 
intentional foot-dragging by the international actors involved.  If the time lag 
problem in the current system is in fact an intended result of the international 
community, then one must consider whether that very same community would 
find ways to cause a similar delay in action in any sort of international 
response.  In addressing this issue, the fundamental undertaking must be an 
inquiry into the rationales that may lead current actors to desire such a time 
lag.  Assuming for a moment that the time lag problem is an intended result of 
the current system, the two most evident rationales for such an intention seem 
to be: 
• the existence of countervailing geopolitical constraints and state 
interests among the actors, and  
• the desire of the international community to weigh the facts and 
evidence carefully before initiating any sort of concerted action.   
While the former is an inherent aspect of current international relations and 
the latter is certainly an admirable means of meting out justice under most 
circumstances, neither is appropriate when dealing with impending or existing 
cases of genocide.  As previously noted, the system I propose seeks to involve 
NGOs at such a fundamental level of the decision-making process precisely 
because of their general exclusion from international politics and their typical 
mandate to preserve human rights above all else.  Thus, these NGOs would be 
more likely to serve the goals of the Genocide Convention, those of 
suppressing and preventing incidents of genocide, rather than the other 
motivations that weigh on the decisions of political leaders at both national 
and supranational levels.   
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But if the time lag in responding to cases of genocide is intentional, 
then wouldn’t these members of the international community find a new way 
to impede the swift response of a new system?  While the aim of seeking 
some sort of international democracy is certainly an admirable goal, the price 
of involving the entire world community in international affairs is that many 
of these nation-states will inevitably seek to act in furtherance of their own 
individual interests rather than those of the collective majority.  In many 
aspects of international affairs and supranational politics this price is not too 
steep.  It maintains some semblance of balance and reciprocity among nation-
states and as such serves the goals of the international geopolitical structure.  
But addressing ongoing cases of genocide is no place for slow, deliberate 
diplomacy.  Addressing the scourge of genocide requires its prompt 
identification and response so that it can be stopped before the human toll 
becomes too great.  While the system I propose may not be without flaws,  by 
involving NGOs at the initial – and perhaps most important – stage of such a 
process, the wheels of international action will be set in motion much sooner.    
 
 
Erosion of State Sovereignty  
 
 It is likely that some states will contest granting greater deference to 
NGOs to identify cases of genocide as an action that comes at the expense of 
their own state sovereignty.  This contention seems to have two prongs:   
• under the current system, the UN appointed Commission of Experts is 
more representative of state interests because it is part of the United 
Nations, and thus is at least somewhat accountable to the states that 
compose the UN, and  
• allowing NGOs to declare that genocidal acts are occurring within the 
territorial boundaries of a nation-state deprives that nation-state of 
some of the sovereignty it is generally granted within its own borders.  
The first prong of this argument is fallacious by way of its underlying 
assumption.  As noted above, NGOs can still be held accountable to the 
international community, though perhaps in a less direct way than the United 
Nations itself.  However, it is more likely that NGOs will act in much the 
same capacity of reporting information to the ICC or the UN that the 
Commissions of Experts did in Rwanda and Bosnia.  Thus, as accountable 
actors in a modified international system, the NGOs will tread no more on the 
sovereignty of individual states than the Commissions of Experts have done 
under the current system.   
 
The second prong of the argument, while an inherent and 
understandable contention in any issue of supranational regulation, pales in 
comparison to the preservation of human life that the Genocide Convention 
seeks to affirm.  The affirmation of international human rights, the goal of the 
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Genocide Convention and numerous other international conventions, must 
inevitably come at the expense of the sovereignty of the nation-state.  This is 
an inherent aspect of recognizing the rights of individuals vis-à-vis those of 
the state itself.  But I find it unlikely that granting NGOs greater deference in 
identifying cases of genocide will infringe more heavily on the sovereignty of 
nation-states than the current system. In fact, since they will often already 
have a presence in the nation-state where the crisis situation is occurring, the 
use of NGOs in the international decision-making process will probably 
require less of an abrogation of the territorial sovereignty of a particular 
nation-state than that required by the current system.   
 
Nation-states may also contend that granting such authority to NGOs 
creates a dubious precedent for granting additional powers to NGOs in the 
future.  But the authority that I suggest be granted to NGOs is not an absolute 
power free from checks and regulations.  What I suggest is simply that 
international human rights NGOs such as the ICRC be given authority to 
identify exactly those gross human rights abuses, such as genocide, that is 
their mandate to avert.  Granting NGOs authority to identify cases of genocide 
does not in itself set a precedent for granting future powers to all NGOs.  A 
decision to grant NGOs more authority in any other context must inevitably 
involve a consideration of the statutory provisions and practical concerns 
relevant to such a decision.  While granting international human rights NGOs 
authority to identify cases of genocide may set some a precedent for ceding 
even greater authority to such NGOs, the fact that such a grant is made only in 
an effort to stop genocide, the most horrific of all crimes, sets the bar for any 
subsequent grants of authority very high indeed.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Simply put, genocide is the most heinous of all crimes.  It is 
methodical.  It is brutal.  It is irreversible.  It is final.  The international 
community sought to address this issue by adopting the Genocide Convention 
in 1948.  But the Convention has not ended the killing and other genocial 
atrocities.  While the world may have tried to deny the existence of genocide 
in the past, the interconnected world of on-demand information we live in 
today makes denial facile and unrealistic.  As rational, moral beings we can 
no longer look the other way.  But even now, in the wake of the Holocaust, 
Bosnia, and Rwanda, the international community sits idly by as tens of 
thousands are slaughtered in Darfur, Sudan.97  According to the United States 
                                                 
97 See The Website of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
Committee on Conscience, Sudan: Darfur Overview available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/alert/darfur/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).  
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Agency for International Development (USAID), 350,000 or more civilians 
may die in the coming months.98  Something must be done.   
 
 Despite the fact that national governments and the U.N. have done 
little to stop the atrocities in Darfur, there have been calls to action.  
International human rights NGOs have stepped in and tried to aid the victims 
of Sudan.  These NGOs have workers on the ground right now assisting 
communities in crisis, while the rest of the world sits by and debates what to 
do.  It is these NGOs that should be reporting to the ICC, the UN, or any other 
responsible body.  It is these NGOs that are dealing with the realities of the 
conflict on a daily basis.  It is these NGOs that are in the best position to 
report on the existence of genocidal situations during crisis situations or 
periods of political instability.  It is these NGOs that can best alert the world 
to the atrocities being committed and make the proclamation, “Never again,” 
into something more than an empty promise. 
 
Giving international human rights NGOs greater authority to identify 
cases of genocide will not significantly alter the world power structure.  It will 
simply put the official control over designating an act as genocide in the 
hands of those who know all too well the ramifications of such a designation.  
It is my sincere hope that granting these NGOs such authority will speed up 
the international response in dealing with cases of genocide.  Of course, the 
realities of international politics may still render these efforts futile.  But we 
owe it to the tens of millions of people that have already been slaughtered 
because of their race, religion, nationality, or ethnicity, to give it a good faith 
try. 
 
                                                 
98 Id.  
